Gentile goes back to the primary sources to show how history has been misused and abused in order to bolster the dangerous myths of counterinsurgency. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former columnist for The New York Times A must-read for our national security experts and U.S.

It would have been far harder to make those tragic mistakes. “How I wish we’d had this telling critique of counterinsurgency warfare before Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. “Based on his personal experience in Baghdad as well as some fine historical scholarship, Colonel Gentile takes aim at America’s current COIN doctrines and shows how ineffective they really are. An exceptionally courageous book, clearly and forcibly written.” -Martin van Creveld, author of The Transformation of War offers by far the most convincing explanation extant of why America has not succeeded recently with COIN.” -Colin Gray, director, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Reading professor of history, Stanford University, and editor of The Modern American Military Wrong Turn deserves a wide readership by all who must make these supremely important strategy decisions-as well as those who will live with the consequences.” -David M. Have COIN tactics ever worked the military magic their proponents claim? Or have they merely provided cover for beating exits from wars that never should have been fought in the first place?. “Colonel Gentile asks us to confront some blisteringly urgent questions. This book will enter the canon of indispensable works in the history of counterinsurgency theory and is essential reading for soldiers, statesmen, strategists, and anyone who cares about the making of American national security policy.” -Celeste Ward Gventer wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, written by a soldier-scholar who led American troops during some of the worst violence in Baghdad. “The definitive challenge to what became the prevailing orthodoxy during the U.S. It is required reading for military historians and policy makers alike.” -Robert Citino, professor of history, University of North Texas Wrong Turn reflects not only those original arguments but also five years of mature reflection. Back in 2008, at a time when analysts seemed giddy about the virtues of the surge and were busy constructing a triumphalist narrative of the war in Iraq, Gentile had already stood up as a kind of one-man loyal opposition-poking holes in COIN theory and asking some pointed questions about the army’s ability to transform foreign societies in our image.

military’s current obsession with counterinsurgency, Colonel Gian Gentile can claim a certain precedence: he was there first. Note: the ideas in this book are the author’s alone, not the Department of Defense’s. strategy in Afghanistan have been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts have questioned the necessity and efficacy of COIN-essentially armed nation-building-in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda.ĭrawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a searing reevaluation of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan.Īs the issue of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan inevitably rises to the top of the national agenda, Wrong Turn will be a major new touchstone for what went wrong and a vital new guide to the way forward. Colonel Gian Gentile’s 2008 article “Misreading the Surge” in World Politics Review first exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals that has since been playing out in strategy sessions at the Pentagon, in classrooms at military academies, and on the pages of the New York Times.

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